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ii.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann, §78-2A-3(2)(j), and Article VIII Section 4
of the Utah Constitution.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does Utah law provide insurance coverage to

an employee who is acting beyond the scope of his employment,
under an insurance policy which is issued to and names his
employer as the "named insured"?
2.

Does Utah law allow a finding that an

employee had permission to go and party with a company vehicle
when the employee admits that he was given and understood
specific and express instructions not to use the company
vehicle for personal errands?
3.

Is there insurance coverage under the implied

permission theory when the user grossly deviates from his prior
open and notorious use of the vehicle?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation would
determine the issues at hand.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Insurance Company ("USF&G"), filed this action seeking a
declaratory judgment as to potential coverage under a policy it
had issued to the J.R. Broadbent Company.

USF&G named as

defendants J.R. Broadbent Company employee Benny 01sen, and
two injured non-employees, Kathy Brooks and Melissa Albee.
Kathy Brooks and Melissa Albee were injured while
riding in a Broadbent company vehicle that was being operated
by Broadbent employee Benny Olsen.
file an Answer.

Mr. Olsen did not

Ms. Brooks and Ms. Albee both filed answers

and contested the allegation that there was no coverage.

In

addition, Ms. Brooks filed a Third-Party Complaint against J.R.
Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Livestock.

The Third-Party

Complaint was dismissed on March 3, 1989.
On April 6, 1989, a bench trial was held.
testimony was presented through depositions.

All

At the conclusion

of the testimony Judge Brian immediately ruled from the Bench.
Judge Brian entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

He found coverage for two reasons.

Judgment were signed on April 24, 1989.
-2-

An Order and a

Appellant USF&G filed its Notice of Appeal on May
24, 1989.

II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The J.R. Broadbent Livestock Company owns various
ranch property in the Manila, Utah area.
Ranch is run by Paul Franklin.
trailer on the ranch.

Its South Valley

Paul Franklin lives in a

Mr. Franklin hired his grandson Benny

Olsen to work as a ranch employee.

Mr. Olsen lived in a

separate trailer near Mr. Franklin's.

(Franklin deposition

pp. 5, and 11.)
Each of the Broadbent employees was assigned a pickup
truck for use while working on the South Valley Ranch.

The

South Valley Ranch does not have any written guidelines
pertaining to the use of the company trucks.

Broadbent

employees were allowed to use the vehicles to travel to and
from work.

In addition, the Broadbent employees were allowed

to use the company trucks to run errands in Manila or to travel
to Wyoming to buy supplies.

Paul Franklin, the ranch manager,

told all the employees not to use the company-owned trucks for
socializing after hours.

He remembered specifically telling

this to his grandson Benny Olsen.

Benny Olsen

confirmed that he had been told and understood this
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information.

(Franklin deposition pp. 7, 8 14, Olsen

deposition pp. 6, 9.)
At one time Benny Olsen owned his own vehicle.
He sold it approximately a month or two prior to May 31, 1986.
Mr. Olsen then stored his personal gear, including a
motorcycle and fishing rod, in his assigned pickup.

He

admitted that he started to "slide it off" and use the vehicle
for personal errands.

Paul Franklin once got "pissed off"

and told Benny Olsen that he should not use the vehicle for
personal errands.

(Olsen deposition pp. 6, 9. Shoup

deposition p. 29.)
Mr. Franklin has cancer, therefore he is not always
actively involved in operating the ranch.
helped Mr. Franklin run the ranch.
also worked as an employee.

Robert McKee

His stepson Jim Shoup

Jim Shoup stated that his

step-father was concerned about the amount of gas that Benny
Olsen was using in his company-owned pickup. (Shoup
deposition pp. 61, 68, 71.)
Benny Olsen was working on May 31, 1986.

He used

the pickup while irrigating approximately 13 miles west of
Manila.

Benny Olsen returned to the ranch after completing

his chores.

He took the Broadbent pickup to meet Jim Shoup.

Benny Olsen and Jim Shoup drove in Benny's company-owned pickup
to Manila and bought some beer.
vehicle to Dutch John, Utah.

They then drove in the same

They bought more beer in Dutch
-4-

John, Utah, and eventually met respondents, Kathy Brooks and
Melissa Albee.

When the accident happened Benny Olsen

and the two girls were riding in the pickup.
third girl were following in her car.

Jim Shoup and a

They were traveling to

Wyoming to buy more beer when the accident occurred.
Olsen was fired the next day.

Benny

(Olsen deposition pp. 10,

11, 12, 13, 15, and 16.)
The J.R. Broadbent Ranch had obtained an insurance
policy from the USF&G Insurance Company.

The insurance

policy was a standard commercial automobile insurance policy.
The policy contained several provisions pertaining to who was
an insured.
a.

The policy contained the following definitions:
"You" and "your" mean the person or
organization shown as the named
insured in Item 1 of the
Declarations. (Item 1 listed J.R.
Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Ranch.)

The policy provided under Section IV(d) who is insured as
follows:
1.

You are an insured for any covered
auto.

2.

Anyone else is an insured while using
with your permission a covered auto
you own, hire or borrow except:
(a) Someone using a covered auto you
hire or borrow from one of your
employees or a member of his or her
household.
(b) Someone using a covered auto
while he or she is working in the
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business of selling, servicing,
repairing or parking autos.
The Trial Court entered various findings of fact.
(See Attachment.)

The Court then concluded as a matter of law

that since Mr. Olsen was an employee driving a Broadbent
vehicle, that he was a named insured under the policy.

In

addition the Court concluded as a matter of law that
Mr. Olsen's open and "notorious" use of the vehicle
established implied permission for any use by him of the
vehicle, and therefore that he was entitled to insurance
coverage under the Broadbent policy.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The USF&G insurance policy lists J.R. Broadbent an
individual and the J.R. Broadbent Ranch as insureds.
Broadbent is entitled to insurance.

Mr. J.R.

The Ranch is entitled to

coverage for liability it faces for automobile accidents.

It

can only face liability for an employee's accident if that
employee is within the scope and course of his employment.
Benny Olsen was not within the scope and course of his
employment at the time the accident occurred.

Therefore, he is

not a named insured under the policy.
Utah has adopted the strict construction theory in
regards to permissive users of automobiles.

The strict

construction theory is that if one deviates from his "permitted
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use" of a vehicle there is no insurance coverage.

Mr. Olsen

was given permission to use the vehicle to perform his work
functions.

He could have obtained permission to use the

vehicle to travel to Manila or Wyoming to buy personal
supplies.

Mr. Olsen violated this permitted use by taking

the vehicle after hours for his own personal entertainment.
Therefore this is no coverage.
The trial court judge found that Mr. Olsen had
implied permission to use the vehicle, and under the liberal
construction theory that this permission went to any and all
uses.

The majority view adopts a third position of minor or

gross deviations.

This theory looks at the time, place, and

purpose of the deviation from the permitted use.

Benny

Olsen's deviation is not related in time, place, or purpose
to the implied permission that was given to him.

Therefore, as

there was a gross deviation from the permitted use Benny
Olsen did not have permission to use the vehicle and thus
there was no insurance coverage.

-7-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
EMPLOYEES ARE COVERED UNDER COMMERCIAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES AS NAMED INSUREDS ONLY WHEN
ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE AND COURSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT.
A determinative issue in this appeal is whether or
not there is insurance coverage for an employee who is using a
company vehicle after hours and beyond the scope of his
employment.

If so, the other issues are moot.

The USF&G Insurance Company issued a standard
commercial automobile policy to J.R. Broadbent, dba
J.R. Broadbent Ranch.
insureds.

The policy listed no other named

It listed all the J.R. Broadbent vehicles as covered

autos.
On May 31, 1986, Broadbent employee Benny Olsen
was involved in an accident near Dutch John, Utah.

Dutch John

is located approximately 25 miles from Manila where Benny
Olsen worked and lived.

After finishing work Benny Olsen

and fellow employee Jim Shoup bought some beer and drove in
Mr. Olsen's assigned Broadbent pickup to Manila.

They bought

more beer in Dutch John and were "partying" with some newly
made female acquaintances.

The group was traveling by a "back

road" to Wyoming to get more beer when the accident occurred.
Mr. Olsen and Mr. Shoup admitted they were not
within the scope of their employment when the accident
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occurred.

In addition, both Mr. Shoup and Mr. Olsen

admitted that they knew they did not have permission to use the
vehicle when they left Manila and were traveling to Dutch John.
The trial court concluded that Mr. Olsen was a
named insured under the policy.

The named insureds are listed

on Item 1 of the Declarations of the policy.

Item 1 of the

Declarations listed J.R. Broadbent and the J.R. Broadbent
Ranch.

It did not mention employees, officers, or directors.

The policy states that the named insureds and those defined as
"you" are insured when using any covered auto.
The term "you" is defined by the policy as the person
or organization listed in Item 1.

The vehicle Mr. Olsen was

using was listed as a covered auto.

If Mr. J.R. Broadbent was

using that vehicle he would be insured at all times.

Benny

Olsen was not specifically listed as a named insured.
Therefore, he can only be insured as a representative of the
J.R. Broadbent Ranch.

He only represented the Ranch when he

was acting within the scope and course of his employment.
The policy does not state that Mr. Olsen was
covered when acting within the scope and course of his
employment.

However, when he was acting in this capacity, his

employer, J.R. Broadbent Ranch, was responsible for his
actions.

Therefore since his employer was responsible and

faces a risk of paying damages, as the named insured there
should be coverage for it and Benny Olsen under the policy.
-9-

The J.R. Broadbent Ranch is an organization and not
an individual.

It cannot operate a vehicle.

However, its

owner has the right to expect coverage for it as a named
insured on the automobile insurance policy when it faces
vicarious liability for a vehicular accident.

The ranch can

only be held liable for automobile accidents that occur when
its employees are acting within the scope and course of their
employment.

To meet this expectation coverage should be

extended to provide protection to employees within the scope of
their employment.

To extend coverage further than this does

not fit either the specific terms of the policy, nor the
reasonable expectations of its owner.
The trial court ruled that all Broadbent employees
were covered at all times when they were using a listed
vehicle.

This is not stated in the policy.

If the policy had

intended coverage for all employees at all times they could
have been individually listed as named insureds.

J.R.

Broadbent also could have requested and paid for coverage for
groups such as "ranch managers" or "ranch hands."

If so

USF&G would be able to assess this expanded risk and charge
an extra premium to cover all employees at all times.

This

coverage would then extend to all the employees whether they
had stolen a listed vehicle, were using a listed vehicle
without permission, or in this case had taken a listed vehicle
for a party in a different state.
-10-

The cases in Utah and other jurisdictions that relate
to employees' insurance coverage all deal with the omnibus or
permissive user clause.
and III below.

This issue is discussed in Points

II

In all such cases the courts have ruled that

the key issue is whether the employees, when beyond the scope
and course of their employment, had permission to use the
vehicle, and if so, how they deviated from such permission.
None of these cases held that employees are covered at all
times when they go beyond the scope and course of their
employment.

To write in such coverage in this situation is to

create a fiction which is beyond the terms of the policy and
the intentions of the parties and will impact every commercial
automobile policy on the insurance market.
POINT II
BENNY OLSEN WAS TOLD AND SPECIFICALLY UNDERSTOOD
HE DID NOT HAVE EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
PERMISSION TO USE THE BROADBENT VEHICLE.
Benny Olsen had been assigned the use of a
specific Broadbent company vehicle.

He and the other

employees had access to company gasoline tanks.

Employees were

allowed to use the vehicles to come and go from work.

In

addition, they were allowed to run errands to the nearby town
of Manila or on infrequent occasions to travel to Wyoming to
purchase supplies.

Although there was nothing in writing,

ranch foreman Paul Franklin stated that he specifically
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instructed the workers not to use the vehicles for personal
errands.
Benny Olsen admitted that he had been told not to
use the vehicle for personal functions.

Mr. Olsen violated

these instructions and started to use the vehicle after work
for personal errands.
reprimanded him.

Mr. Franklin discovered this and

Benny Olsen however continued to store

his personal gear in the vehicle and to borrow it for local
errands.

There is no evidence that he ever used it for

excursions beyond the Manila area.
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed insurance
coverage situations where a user violated express instructions
not to use a vehicle.

In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v.

Transamerica Ins. Co./ 484 P.2d 1180 (Utah 1971);

the facts

were that James Allen let his 16-year-old brother-in-law use
his jeep with specific instructions that the jeep was to be
used only to go to and from his job at a livestock show.

The

brother-in-law was specifically told not to "run around" in the
jeep.

The 16-year-old violated these orders and used the

vehicle to go to a dance.

An accident occurred while he was

coming home from the dance.

The plaintiff, who was injured in

the accident, attempted to argue in a subsequent declaratory
judgment action that there was insurance coverage for the
brother-in-law under the theory that once an individual is
given permission to use a vehicle that coverage extends to all
-12-

uses, whether contemplated by the owner or not.

The trial

court granted the insurer summary judgment, and entered a
finding that there was no coverage.
Court affirmed.

On appeal the Utah Supreme

The Supreme Court noted that the 16-year-old

had specific knowledge that he could not use the vehicle for
other than work purposes.

Therefore the court held that once

the 16-year-old knowingly violated these instructions, he did
not have permission to use the vehicle and thus there was no
coverage.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this holding one year
later in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Strang,
496 P.2d 707 (Utah 1972).

In Strang a State Farm insured

was involved in an accident involving an uninsured automobile
owned by a Mrs. Hamberlin.

Mrs. Hamberlin had specifically

forbidden her 15-year-old daughter Debra to drive the
vehicle.

However she left her keys in the drain board so her

son could move some belongings into the garage.

Debra took

the keys and went for a joy ride with her friend Wendy.
Debra gave Wendy, a State Farm insured, permission to drive
the car and an accident occurred.
declaratory judgment action.

State Farm filed a

The trial court granted it

summary judgment, and entered a finding that there was no
coverage.

On appeal the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.

The

Supreme Court stated that since Debra had been specifically
forbidden to use the automobile, and was therefore not in
-13-

lawful possession of it, she could not have give permission to
her friend Wendy.

Thus Wendy was not a permissive user and

there was no coverage under the State Farm policy.
In the case at hand Benny 01sen was allowed to
use the J.R. Broadbent vehicle for work purposes.

Mr. Olsen

admitted that he knew he did not have permission to use the
vehicle for personal errands.

He had been reprimanded for

doing so on a prior occasion.

He admitted that he knew this

was a violation of company policies.

This violation and

resulting accident on May 31, 1986, caused his firing.
Paul Franklin stated that he told Benny Olsen not
to use the vehicle for personal errands.

He was emphatic in

stating that Benny Olsen knew this restriction.

In

addition Jim Shoup, a fellow employee stated that he knew on
May 31, 1986, that he and Benny Olsen did not have
permission to take the vehicle to Dutch John.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the standard that
one does not have insurance coverage when using a vehicle
contrary to its owner's instructions.

The court has stated

that when one knowingly violates a specific instruction not to
use a vehicle, that there should be no coverage.
Benny Olsen admitted that he knowingly violated
such specific instructions.
with him.

The owner of the vehicle agreed

Therefore since they both agreed that Benny

Olsen violated specific instructions limiting Mr. Olsen!s
-14-

use of the vehicle, there should be no insurance coverage for
his actions under the Broadbent policy.
POINT III
IF BENNY OLSEN HAD IMPLIED PERMISSION TO USE
THE BROADBENT VEHICLE IT WAS NEGATED BY HIS
GROSS DEVIATION FROM ANY SUCH
IMPLIED PERMISSION.
The trial court was presented with the theory that
Benny Olsen was an implied permissive user.

The court

found that Mr. Olsen had openly and notoriously used the
vehicle on several occasions.

The court found that these uses

were known by Mr. Franklin, the ranch foreman.

The court then

concluded that since Mr. Franklin knew that Benny Olsen had
repeatedly used the vehicle for personal errands that he had
given him implied permission for unlimited use of the vehicle.
Mr Olsen stored a motorcycle and fishing rod in the
vehicle.

He also used a lot of gas.

However there is no

evidence that Benny Olsen stayed out nights with the
vehicle or that he took it to Dutch John for drinking parties.
Mr. Olsen's activities in doing so on May 31, 1986, were a
gross deviation from his prior open and notorious activities.
The Utah Supreme Court has never dealt with whether a
gross deviation from an implied permissive use negates
insurance coverage.

Other jurisdictions that have done so have

developed four rules.
1.

These rules are as follows:

The strict construction rule;
-15-

2.

The liberal or "hell or high water" rule;

3.

The minor deviation rule; and

4.

The gross deviation rule.

The "hell or high water" rule states that once an
individual is given the general use of the vehicle, he is
permitted to use it in any fashion, and coverage will be found
in every situation.

This theory is the opposite of the above

Utah Supreme Court holdings which limit one strictly to the
permission that is given.

The broad "hell or high water"

position does not look at the intent of the parties, but merely
looks to see if some kind of implied or express permission has
been given to an employee, and if so, insurance coverage is
always found.

This theory was reviewed by the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Smith, 279 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1960).
The majority of courts have taken the middle-ground
position and have adopted the minor deviation rule, or its
counterpart, the newly developed gross deviation rule.

The

Tenth Circuit outlined the minor deviation rule in Fisher v.
Firemans Fund Indemnity Co., 244 F.2d 194 (10th Cir.
1957).

In Fisher, Eve Rumpf was given permission from his

employer to take one of its insured trucks to his residence and
then to his parents1 house on Christmas day.

Mr. Rumpfs

parents lived approximately 15 miles northwest of his
residence.

Mr. Rumpf took the vehicle on Christmas Eve and
-16-

traveled approximately 100 miles on a solely personal journey.
The inevitable accident occurred.

The employer's insurer

brought a declaratory judgment action to determine if there was
coverage.

The trial court found no coverage.

On appeal the

Tenth Circuit reviewed the strict, liberal, and minor deviation
rules.

The court adopted the minor deviation rule and held

under it that coverage was afforded up to the point where there
was a flagrant violation of the "permissive use" of the
vehicle.

The court then noted that since Mr. Rumpf had greatly

deviated in time, purpose, direction, and distance from the
allowed permissive use that it was doubtful that his use of the
vehicle was within the contemplation of the named insured.

The

Tenth Circuit thus found there was no coverage.
The analogous gross deviation rule was first
discussed in Ryan v. Western Pacific Ins. Co., 408 P.2d 84
(Ore. 1965).

In Ryan, a Mr. Sinovick obtained permission

from Tum-A-Lum his employer to use one of its listed vehicles
to move some furniture.

He was told he could return the

vehicle after he finished moving.

Mr. Sinovick finished

moving, but then went to a show, a club, and eventually had an
accident at 1:45 a.m.

The injured party brought suit against

Tum-A-Lum's insurer to determine if there was coverage.

The

trial court adopted the liberal view and found coverage.

On

appeal the Oregon Supreme Court discussed all four theories.
Before doing so the court noted that since the named insured
-17-

was the employer and Sinovick was not specifically added as a
named insured, that once he was beyond the scope and course of
his employment, he was not a named insured.

When looking at

the three existing theories, the Oregon court stated it was
"loathe" to adopt any of them.

The court first rejected the

liberal view because it did not conform to the risks that were
sought by the insured or given by the insurer.

The court

rejected the strict view because it did not provide enough
protection to those injured by careless drivers.

It rejected

the minor deviation rule as too restrictive.

The Oregon court

instead developed the gross deviation rule.

It described this

rule as providing coverage if the actual use did not represent
a gross deviation from the permission given.

In determining

this the court looked at three factors; the purpose, time, and
place of the actual use.

The court found that if the driving

was not so related to the original permission that there should
be no coverage.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously adopted the
strict construction rule.

As argued in Point II, this rule is

that if there is any deviation from the permission given that
there is no coverage.

In this situation that appears to be the

case.
However if this court is to reject that position, the
next most attractive theory is that of the minor or gross
deviation rule.

When applying this rule the trial court should
-18-

review the purpose, time, and place of the actual use to
determine if it falls within the expectations of the permittee
and permittor.
Benny Olsen was permitted to use the vehicle for
company business and local authorized personal errands.

In

addition it became his pattern to use the vehicle to travel to
the town, ride his motorcycle, or go fishing.

All of these

activities were done in and around the rural, unpopulated
Manila area.

At most it can be said that Mr. Olsen was given

implied permission to use the vehicle around Manila.
The accident in question occurred when Benny
Olsen went on a drinking spree in Dutch John, Utah.
Mr. Olsen traveled 3 0 to 40 miles to Dutch John and became
intoxicated.

He then picked up two women and was on his way to

Wyoming for more beer when the accident occurred.

This was not

a slight, but instead was a gross deviation from any express or
implied permission.
The J.R. Broadbent Company, Benny Olsen's
employer and the insured, did not want him to use the vehicle
for other than work purposes.

However, the court found that he

had implied permission to use it for open and notorious
personal errands.

In doing so, the court imposed on the

employer an intent to permit Benny Olsen to use its vehicle
for personal errands around Manila, Utah.

This intent should

not be extended to allowing Mr. Olsen to travel to Dutch John
-19-

or Wyoming on drinking sprees.

This limitation is shown by the

fact that Benny Olsen was fired the day after the
accident.
Benny Olsen was using the vehicle after hours,
and was not headed back to the ranch when the accident
occurred.

In addition he was a great distance away from the

ranch and traveling away from it.

Thus when applying the three

factors: purpose, time, and place, it is clear that his actions
constituted a gross and not minor deviation from the permission
given.
If this court adopts the implied permission standard,
it should then also adopt the minor or gross deviation
rule.

In applying this rule to this situation, it is clear

that Mr. Olsen grossly deviated from any implied permission.
The trial court entered a finding of fact that Mr. Olsen was
an implied permissive user.

It was argued unsuccessfully that

the court should then adopt the gross or minor deviation rule.
The court instead adopted the "hell or high water" rule and
said that once Mr. Olsen had permission, he could do as he
pleased.

This is a minority position and one that Utah should

not adopt.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court decision.
not listed as a named insured.

First, Benny Olsen was

He was an employee, but

employees were not listed on the policy.

He was not acting

within the scope of his employment as an employee when the
accident occurred.

Thus he was not a named insured under the

policy.
Mr. Olsen was given specific instructions not to
use the vehicle.

Utah law does not allow for deviations from

such express restrictions.

Therefore there is no coverage.

Finally if coverage is allowed under an implied
permissive use theory, there is no coverage for Mr. Olsen1s
actions that were a gross deviation from those that were
intended.

Thus the trial court decision should be reversed and

this Court should enter a ruling finding there is no coverage
for Benny Olsen's actions or in the alternative should
remit this matter for specific findings by the trial court in
regard to Benny Olsen!s prior uses and his deviation
therefrom.
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DATED t h i s

10-

day o f

Mo"~4xs

1989.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
Attorney for Plaintiff
USF&G Insurance Company
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Gregory J. Sanders
Gregory M. Holbrook
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City Centre I, #300
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722
Attorney for Kathy Brooks
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 225-1632
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BENNY OLSEN, KATHY BROOKS,
and MELISSA ALBEE,
Defendants.

Civil No. C86-8706

KATHY BROOKS,
Third Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. R. BROADBENT, dba J.R.
BROADBENT LIVESTOCK,
Third Party
Defendant.
This matter having
Plaintiff's

Complaint

come before the Court
seeking

declaratory

for trial on
judgment

that

Plaintiff, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company,
was not liable to pay under a policy of insurance and this matter
having come before the Court for trial on the 6th day of April,
1989, and Robert G. Gilchrist having appeared as counsel for

Plaintiff;

and

Defendant, Kathy

Brooks, was

present

and

represented by Richard B. Johnson; Melissa Albee was present and
represented by counsel, Thomas R. Patton.

The Defendant Benny

Olsen was not present but notice had been sent to Mr. Olsen and
several attempts to subpoena Mr. Olsen to testify were made.
J.R. Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Livestock was not present
having previously been dismissed by the Court pursuant to Motion
for Summary Judgment.
This Court having heard the evidence presented by counsel
and argument of the law relating to the issues and being fully
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The only issue to be decided by the Court is whether

United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company is liable
for coverage of the accident pursuant to the policy of insurance
sold to J.R. Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Livestock.
2.
(a)

The Court finds, not exclusively, the following:
Benny Olsen used the vehicle belonging to J.R.

Broadbent for personal use including shopping in Rock
Springs, Wyoming on a number of occasions and also
used the vehicle for personal use closer to the ranch;
(b)

On frequent occasions, the personal use was open

and notorious and was evidenced by personal equipment
2

carried in the truck which is used for recreation
including a motorcycle helmet, fishing equipment and
guns ;
(c)

The frequent unauthorized use of the company

vehicle was well known by Benny Olsen's grandfather,
Paul Franklin;
(d)

In spite of Benny Olsen's unauthorized use of the

J.R. Broadbent vehicle, nothing was done to restrict
Mr. Olsen's use of the vehicle or to discipline him
for the unauthorized use of the vehicle;
(e) The unauthorized use was implied by the amount of
gas used in Benny Olsen's truck which was obtained
from the company gas tank;
(f)

The Court finds that pursuant to the words and

phrases section of the policy subheading (a) that J.R.
Broadbent coverage included the organization of J.R.
Broadbent Livestock Company;
(g) The Court specifically finds that Benny Olsen, by
his

employment,

was

a member

and

part

of

the

organization absent an exclusion and, therefore, was
an insured under the policy;
(h)

Benny Olsen had implied permission to use the

J.R. Broadbent vehicle due to the numerous occasions
3

of unauthorized use of the company truck.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Within the terms and conditions of the policy issued to

J.R. Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Livestock Company, the named
insureds

include the J.R.

Broadbent

Company, J.R.

Broadbent

individual, J.R. Broadbent Land Company and Broadbent Livestock
Company.
2. That Benny Olsen was an employee of J.R. Broadbent and,
at the time of the accident, was driving an insured vehicle of
J.R. Broadbents and, consequently, is a named insured under the
terms and conditions of the policy of insurance at issue.
3.

That the policy contained no exclusions that would limit

or qualify Benny Olsen's use of the vehicle as a named insured.
4.

That Benny Olsen, as a named

insured without any

exclusion in the policy, is entitled to the coverage under the
terms and conditions of the policy at issue at the time of the
accident.
5.
Broadbent

That Benny Olsenfs open and notorious use of the J.R.
vehicle without

any

restrictions

on his

use

or

discipline establishes implied permission to use the vehicle and,
consequently, is entitled to the insurance coverage provided.
4

6.

The policy provides that a person is an insured who

drives the vehicle with the permission of a named insured.

The

policy reads specifically "any one else is an insured while using
with your permission a covered auto you own, hire, or borrow. .
it

7.

Given that Benny Olsen had used the vehicle in the past

for shopping

in Rock Springs, Wyoming

as well as using the

vehicle on a number of occasions closer to the ranch, carried
personal

equipment used

for recreation purposes including a

helmet, fishing equipment and guns as well as the amount of gas
used in the vehicle evidences the conclusion that Benny Olsen had
implied permission to use the company vehicle for personal uses.
8.

The insurance coverage is present both because Benny

Olsen qualifies as a named insured and also because there was
implied

permission

to use the vehicle

at the time of the

accident.
DATED this <&-* day of April, 1989.

PAT B. BRIAN
District Court Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

//

da

Y

of

&/2/ud(

,

1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the
following, postage prepaid.
Mr. Thomas R. Patton
2230 N. Univ. Parkway
Cottontree Square, Suite 4-B
Provo, Utah 84604
Mr. Greg Sanders
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Benny 01sen
J.R. Broadbent Ranch
Manilla, Utah 84046
Mr. Robert Gilchrist
Attorney at Law
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722
Attorney for Kathy Brooks
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 225-1632
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
BENNY OLSEN, KATHY BROOKS,
and MELISSA ALBEE,
Defendants,

Civil No. C86-8706

KATHY BROOKS,
Third Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. R. BROADBENT, dba J.R.
BROADBENT LIVESTOCK,
Third Party
Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court for trial on
Plaintiff's

Complaint

seeking

declaratory

judgment

that

Plaintiff, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company,
was not liable to pay under a policy of insurance and this matter
having come before the Court for trial on the 6th day of April,
1989, and Robert G. Gilchrist having appeared as counsel for

Plaintiff;

and

Defendant,

Kathy

Brooks,

was

present

and

represented by Richard B. Johnson; Melissa Albee was present and
represented by counsel, Thomas R. Patton.

The Defendant Benny

Olsen was not present but notice had been sent to Mr. Olsen and
several
J.R.

attempts to subpoena Mr. Olsen to testify were made.

Broadbent,

dba

J.R.

Broadbent

Livestock

was not

present

having previously been dismissed by the Court pursuant to Motion
for Summary Judgment.
The

Court

having

entered

its

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following:
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
1.
United

Plaintiff's Complaint for declaratory judgment absolving
States

Fidelity

and

Guarantee

Insurance

Company

from

insurance coverage in the above-entitled case is denied.
2.

Insurance coverage by United States Fidelity Insurance

Company is hereby ordered.
3.

The Court rules in favor of the Defendants and against

the Plaintiff.
DATED this ^

day of April, 1989.

PATTB. BRIAN
District Court Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

//^^

day of

D/I/ixl

1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the
following, postage prepaid.
Mr. Thomas R. Patton
2230 N. Univ. Parkway
Cottontree Square, Suite 4-B
Provo, Utah 84604
Mr. Greg Sanders
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Benny 01sen
J.R. Broadbent Ranch
Manilla, Utah 84046
Mr. Robert Gilchrist
Attorney at Law
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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